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TISON v. ARIZONA.: THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE
NON-TRIGGERMAN: THE SCALES OF JUSTICE
ARE BROKEN
The Supreme Court's struggle to balance the constitutional
rights of convicted criminals with society's need to punish them is
starkly evident in the Court's application of the eighth amendment's
cruel and unusual punishment clause' to non-triggermen 2 defen-
dants sentenced to death. The Court's analysis of the non-trigger-
man death sentence is in flux, and is nearly devoid of any basic
principles that can guide lower courts or legislatures in fashioning
capital punishment sentencing or statutes. Rather than developing
a clear set of rules for lower courts to apply in determining whether
an individual's culpability merits the death penalty, the Court in-
stead applies a rough balancing test on a case-by-case basis, weigh-
ing the nature of the defendant's crime against the severity of the
punishment. When using this test, the Court will find a violation of
the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment if it finds that the punishment is disproportionate to the
crime.3
I U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
2 A non-triggerman is an aider, abettor or co-felon who participates in the felony
but who does not participate in the physical act of killing. See Wickert, Eighth Amend-
ment-The Death Penalty and Vicarious Felony Murder: Nontriggerman may not be Executed Absent
a Finding of an Intent to Kill, 73 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1553-71 (1982).
3 The Court and some commentators have referred to this analysis as a "propor-
tionality test." See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2972 (1989); id. at 2981
(O'Connor,J., concurring); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 148 (1987); id. at 168 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983); Schwartz, Eighth Amend-
ment Proportionality Analysis and the Compelling Case of William Rummel, 71 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 378 (1980); The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119
(1987); Note, Redefining a Culpable Mental State for Non-Triggermen Facing the Death Penalty,
33 VILL. L. REV. 367 (1988) (authored byjamesJ. Holman). The use of the term "pro-
portionality," however, is illusory because it conveys the image of a detailed analysis.
Because the "proportionality test" is ill-defined and has not yet become much more
than a weighing of components, this Note refers to it as a balancing test.
The eighth amendment concept of proportionality first appeared in Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), but the Court did not refer to this balancing analysis
as a "proportionality test" until fairly recently, beginning with Solem, 463 U.S. at 292.
This balancing test is essentially based upon "evolving standards of decency" as con-
temporary society views punishments in relation to the crimes committed. Trop v. Dul-
les, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). For a critical analysis of the Court's reliance on "evolving
standards of decency," see Shawde, Jurisprudential Confusion in Eighth Amendment Analysis,
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This Note analyzes Tison v. Arizona,4 which articulated a new
standard for deciding when execution of non-triggermen is cruel
and unusual punishment. Tison held that the actor's mere reckless
disregard for human life and major participation in the underlying
felony is sufficient to justify capital punishment. This new standard
essentially reverses the Court's 1982 decision in Enmund v. Florida,5
in which the Court decided that the fact-finder must find intent to
kill before imposing the death penalty.
This Note examines the new substantive doctrine in Tison v. Ari-
zona and compares it with that of Enmund v. Florida. It then consid-
ers the implications of Tison, and suggests an alternative approach to
death penalty cases involving a non-triggerman. Because of the am-
biguity inherent in the Enmund and Tison decisions, and because of
the Court's failure to define or apply eighth amendment jurispru-
dence adequately, this Note concludes that the Court decided Tison
incorrectly, and that the eighth amendment compels a complete




A. Death Penalty Jurisprudence Prior to Enmund: The
Development of the Balancing Approach
The Supreme Court has prohibited punishments so dispropor-
tionate to the crimes committed that they violate the cruel and unu-
sual punishment clause of the eighth amendment.6 The Supreme
38 U. MIAMI L. REv. 357, 370-72 (1984). See also Radin, TheJurisprudence of Death: Evolv-
ing Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989, 1030-33
(1978):
This phrase [evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society] has become one of those movable semantic units that
acquires a life of its own as courts repeatedly invoke it. Taking the phrase
at face value, however, it quite clearly expresses the view that the clause
[nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted] is meant to embody the
moral concept of cruelty, and that specific conceptions of cruelty may
vary over time....
Once a variable meaning approach to the clause is accepted, it is nec-
essary to face the crucial question in the jurisprudence of the cruel and
unusual punishment clause. To what sources should judges turn in seek-
ing contemporary moral insights on cruelty.
Id. at 1033-34.
For an article discussing the history of the proportionality analysis and the develop-
ment of the eighth amendment, see Schwartz, supra, at 378.
4 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
5 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
6 The Supreme Court actually has used the eighth amendment cruel and unusual
punishment clause only four times since the adoption of the Bill of Rights to invalidate a
punishment rendered by the government. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (the
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Court, however, never has enunciated a precise test for determining
when criminal sentences violate the eighth amendment.7 Instead of
treating the cruel and unusual punishment clause as a static prohibi-
tion against a specified set of punishments, the Supreme Court
treats it as a living doctrine whose requirements change according
to "evolving standards of decency." 8 The Court first formulated the
modern eighth amendment balancing test in Weems v. United States,9
where the Court said that "it is a precept ofjustice that punishment
for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense,"' 0
and thus that the eighth amendment is directed "'against all pun-
ishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly dis-
proportioned to the offenses charged.' "I The Weems Court also
established that the eighth amendment's meaning should be highly
elastic.12
The Court in the past has examined many general concerns in
considering whether the death penalty comports with the require-
ments of the eighth amendment. Some of these include an exami-
nation of: (1) society's views of the crime and the punishment in
question; 13 (2) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the
application of the death penalty for rape is unconstitutional); Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962) (criminal sanctions for addiction to narcotic drugs violates the cruel
and unusual punishment clause); Trop, 356 U.S. 86 (the sanction of loss of nationality for
native born citizens as applied to wartime deserters is a violation of the cruel and unu-
sual punishment clause); and Weems, 217 U.S. 349 (the punishment of cadena temporal-
hard labor for fifteen years, loss of right to transfer property inter vivos and continual
surveillance for life-for falsification of governmental records constitutes cruel and unu-
sual punishment).
7 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 258 (1972) (Brennan,J., concurring) ("The
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause .... is not susceptible of precise definition.");
Trop, 356 U.S. at 99-101 ("The exact scope of the constitutional phrase 'cruel and unu-
sual' has not been detailed by this Court .... This Court has had little occasion to give
precise content to the Eighth Amendment... the words of the Amendment are not
precise, and . . . their scope is not static."); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36
(1878) ("Difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the
constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be
inflicted.").
8 Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
9 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
10 Id. at 367.
11 - Id at 371 (quoting O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J.,
dissenting)).
12 Weems, 217 U.S. at 373 ("Time works changes, brings into existence new condi-
tions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider applica-
tion than the mischief which gave it birth."); see also Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (The Court
furthered this idea of elasticity and stated that the cruel and unusual punishment clause
should be seen in light of the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.").
13 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 152 (1987) ("Like the Enmund Court, we find the
state legislatures'judgment as to proportionality in these circumstances relevant to this
[eighth amendment] constitutional inquiry."); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291-92
(1983) ("[lt may be helpful to compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the
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penalty;1 4 (3) whether the punishment is disproportionate to the
severity of the crime; 15 (4) whether the punishment is an affront to
human dignity:16 (5) whether the punishment contributes to the
two social purposes of the death penalty-retribution and deter-
rence; 17 and (6) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the
same jurisdiction. If more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less
serious penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at issue may be excessive.
... [C]ourts may [also] find it useful to compare the sentences imposed for commission
of the same crime in other jurisdictions."); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788-89
(1982) ("[T]he Court looked to the historical development of the punishment at issue,
legislative judgments, international opinion, and the sentencing decisions juries have
made .... We proceed in a similar manner."); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592
(1977) ("[A]ttention must be given to the public attitudes concerning a particular sen-
tence-history and precedent, legislative attitudes, and the response ofjuries reflected
in their sentencing decisions are to be consulted."); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173
(1976) ("Thus, an assessment of contemporary values concerning the infliction of a
challenged sanction is relevant to the application of the Eighth Amendment .... [This
assessment requires] that we look to objective indicia that reflect the public attitude
toward a given sanction."); cf Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2981 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Because it is sufficiently clear that today no national con-
sensus forbids the imposition of capital punishment in these circumstances, 'the implicit
nature of the [Missouri] Legislature's decision [to authorize the death penalty for youths
16 years of age [is] not . . . constitutionally problematic.' ") (quoting Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2711 (1988)).
14 Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2959 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("We gauge whether a punishment is disproportionate by com-
paring 'the gravity of the offense,' understood to include not only the injury caused, but
also the defendant's moral culpability, with 'the harshness of the penalty.' ") (quoting
Solem, 463 U.S. at 292); Solem, 463 U.S. at 292 ("In sum, a court's proportionality analy-
sis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the
gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty."); Tison, 481 U.S. at 179 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 292).
15 Tison, 481 U.S. at 181-82 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("States may not impose pun-
ishment that is disproportionate to the severity of the offense."); Solem, 463 U.S. at 290
("In sum, we hold as a matter of principle that a criminal sentence must be proportion-
ate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted."); Coker, 433 U.S. at 592
("a punishment is 'excessive' and unconstitutional if it... is grossly out of proportion to
the severity of the crime"); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 ("[T]he punishment must not be
grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime."); Weems, 217 U.S. at 371 (quoting
O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892)) ("[the cruel and unusual punishment
clause is directed] 'against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity
are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged.' "); Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2959 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (A majority of the Court reaffirms the
well-established principle that "application of the death penalty to particular categories
of crimes or classes of offenders violates the Eighth Amendment [if] it 'makes no mea-
surable contribution to the goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering' or [if] it is 'grossly out of
proportion to the severity of the crime.' ") (citations omitted).
16 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 ("But our cases also make clear that public perceptions of
standards of decency with respect to criminal sanctions are not conclusive. A penalty
also must accord with 'the dignity of man,' which is the 'basic concept underlying the
Eighth Amendment.' ") (citation omitted); Trop, 356 U.S. at 100 ("The basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.").
17 See Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2959 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("We require that a punishment further the penal goals of detterance or retribu-
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same jurisdiction and the sentences imposed for commission of the
same crime in other jurisdictions. 18 Lockett v. Ohio suggests that the
eighth amendment mandates along with these concerns an individu-
alized consideration of the defendant's culpability.19
Recently the Court has made its eighth amendment analysis
tion"); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183: ("The death penalty is said to serve two principal social
purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders."); see
also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) ("Unless the death penalty... measur-
ably contributes to ... these goals [retribution and deterrence], it is 'nothing more than
the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,' and hence an unconsti-
tutional punishment.") (citing Coker, 433 U.S. at 592).
18 Solem, 463 U.S. at 292 ("In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the
Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including ... (ii) the
sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.").
19 Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2946 ("Our decisions subsequent toJurek have reaffirmed that
the Eighth Amendment mandates an individualized assessment of the appropriateness
of the death penalty. In Lockett v. Ohio, a plurality of this Court held that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer 'not be precluded from considering,
as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's charactor or record and any of the cir-
cumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death.' ") (citations omitted) (emphasis in original); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538,
545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In my view, evidence about the defendant's
background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that
defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged back-
ground, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants
who have no excuse. This emphasis on culpability in sentencing decisions has long been
reflected in Anglo-Americanjurisprudence .... Lockett and Eddings reflect the belief that
punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defend-
ant."); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
In the past two years Justice Scalia, and perhaps other members of the Court, have
abandoned the balancing test and the traditional eighth amendment jurisprudence in
favor of a revisionist and largely "hands-off" approach. Justice Scalia focuses instead on
only one prong of the balancing test: whether or not a national consensus against the
imposition of the punishment exists. This national concensus is reflected solely by legis-
lative enactments and jury verdicts. Under Justice Scalia's view, if the government en-
acts a statute providing for a certain punishment and the jury imposes that punishment
then the punishment can be neither cruel nor unusual. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S.
Ct. 2969, 2979-80 (1989) (Scalia, J., writing for the plurality) ("The punishment is either
'cruel and unusual' (i.e., society has set its face against it) or it is not. The audience for
these arguments, in other words, is not this Court but the citizenry of the United States.
It is they, not we, who must be persuaded .... We discern neither a historical nor a
modern societal consensus forbidding the imposition of capital punishment on any per-
son who murders at 16 or 17 years of age. Accordingly, we conclude that such punish-
ment does not offend the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment."); id. at 2981 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) ("I am unable... to join
the remainder of the plurality's opinion for reasons I stated in Thompson. Part V of the
plurality's opinion 'emphatically reject[s]' ... the suggestion that, beyond an assessment
of the specific enactments of American legislatures, there remains a constitutional obli-
gation imposed upon this Court to judge whether the 'nexus between the punishment
imposed and the defendant's blameworthiness' is proportional."); id. at 2986 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) ("Justice Scalia forthrightly states in his separate opinion that Eighth
Amendment analysis is at an end once legislation and jury verdicts relating to the pun-
ishment in question are analyzed as indicators of contemporary values. A majority of
the Court rejected this revisionist view as recently as last Term .... Justice Scalia's
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under the rubric of a balancing test. 20 This balancing test is appar-
ently a mere weighing of the six factors, or some combination
thereof, previously mentioned. Reduced to its most elemental defi-
nition, the balancing analysis is essentially the weighing of the sever-
ity of the crime with the harshness of the punishment in light of
contemporary societal views.
B. The Court Finds the Death Penalty Constitutional by Using
the Balancing Approach
In the early 1970s, individual Supreme Court Justices began to
doubt the constitutionality of the death penalty.21 In 1972, in
Furman v. Georgia,22 the Court granted a writ of certiorari to deter-
mine whether capital punishment violated the eighth and fourteenth
approach would largely return the task of defining the contours of Eighth Amendment
protection to political majorities.").
20 See Tison, 481 U.S. at 148, 152, 155; id. at 168 (Brennen, J., dissenting); Solem 463
U.S. at 292; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788, 812-13 (1982); Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977); and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910) (quot-
ing O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting)).
21 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 305 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring):
In sum, the punishment of death is inconsistent with all four princi-
ples: Death is an unusually severe and degrading punishment; there is a
strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily; its rejection by contempo-
rary society is virtually total; and there is no reason to believe that it
serves any penal purpose more effectively than the less severe punish-
ment of imprisonment. The function of these principles is to enable a
court to determine whether a punishment comports with human dignity.
Death, quite simply, does not.
Id. at 369 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Assuming knowledge of all the facts presently
available regarding capital punishment, the average citizen would, in my opinion, find it
shocking to his conscience and sense ofjustice. For this reason alone capital punish-
ment cannot stand.").
Furman was the first time that the constitutionality of the death penalty was seriously
questioned by the Court. At the time of adoption of the federal constitution in 1781 and
the Bill of Rights in 1789, the Framers did not envision the eighth amendment's cruel
and unusual clause as a prohibition of the death penalty. THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA 247 (H.A. Bedau 3d ed. 1982). For general information concerning the origins
and development of the cruel and unusual punishment clause, see Granucci, "Nor Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969);
Comment, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An HistoricalJustification for
the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 783 (1975)
(authored by Deborah A. Schwartz and Jay Wishingrad); Note, The Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635 (1966); Note, 24
HARV. L. REV. 54 (1910).
As early as the 1870s, the Supreme Court had concluded that the death penalty was
constitutional. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878) (The court in dicta implies
that the death penalty per se is not unconstitutional under the eighth amendment, but
rather the method of execution might be.); see also In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447
(1890) ("Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
Constitution.").
22 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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amendments in a murder case and two rape cases.23 The Court did
not hold that the death penalty per se violated the Eighth Amend-
ment, but in aper curiam decision the Court agreed that "the imposi-
tion and carrying out of the death penalty in [these cases] constitute
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments." 24 This 5-4 decision each justice rendering a
separate opinion, invalidated the death penalty statutes of Texas
and Georgia.25 Justices Brennan and Marshall argued that the death
penalty was cruel and unusual in all cases, 26 while Justices Douglas,
Stewart, and White held that the death penalty was cruel and unu-
sual where the sentencing authority had total discretion to impose
the death penalty on capital defendants, because unfettered discre-
tion leads to arbitrariness and discrimination. 27 As death penalty
statutes of Texas and Georgia were typical of almost every other
state's death penalty statutes, the legislatures of those states which
wished to continue sentencing defendants to death began to revise
their statutes to meet the requirements of Furman. In all, thirty-five
state legislatures reacted by passing two types of death penalty stat-
utes: "mandatory and guided discretion." 28 The mandatory stat-
23 Id. at 239. Furman was a consolidation of three cases: Furman v. Georgia (mur-
der conviction);Jackson v. Georgia (rape conviction); and Branch v. Texas, (rape convic-
tion). Id.
24 Id- at 239-40.
25 The particular statutes at issue were: TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1189 (Vernon
1961) (punishment for rape); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971) (effective prior to
July 1, 1969) (punishment for murder) (current provision at GA. R. CRIM. P. 17-10-31
(Michie 1982)); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1302 (Supp. 1971) (effective prior toJuly 1, 1969)
(punishment for rape) (current provision at GA. R. CRIM. P. 17-10-31 (Michie 1982)).
26 Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
27 Furman, 408 U.S. at 256 (Douglas,J., concurring) ("The high service rendered by
the 'cruel and unusual' punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment is to require legis-
latures to write penal laws that are evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to
require judges to see to it that general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and
spottily to unpopular groups . . . these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in
their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredi-
ent not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban
on 'cruel and unusual' punishments."); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("These
death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is
cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and
1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously se-
lected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed.... I
simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the inflic-
tion of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so
wantonly and so freakishly imposed."); id. at 314 (White, J., concurring) ("[P]ast and
present legislative judgment with respect to the death penalty loses much of its force
when viewed in light of the recurring practice of delegating sentencing authority to the
jury and the fact that a jury, in its own discretion and without violating its trust or any
statutory policy, may refuse to impose the death penalty no matter what the circum-
stances of the crime.").
28 ALA. H. B. 212 §§ 2-4. 6-7 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-452 - 13-454
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utes provided for the imposition of the death penalty for those
found guilty of specified crimes, 29 whereas the guided discretion
statutes provided for the weighing of statutory aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances. 30 In 1976, in Gregg v. Georgia,31 the Court pro-
claimed that "the punishment of death does not invariably violate
the Constitution." 32 Using the balancing test the Court held that
(Supp. 1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1302 (Supp. 1975); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.1, 209,
219 (West Supp. 1976); 1974 COLO. SESS. LAws § 24; CONN. REV. STAT. §§ 53a-25, 53a-
35 (b), 53a-46a, 53a-54b (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (West Supp. 1975); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 782.04, 921.141 (West Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-3102, 27-2528,
27-2534.1, 27-2537 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 18-4004 (Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, para. 9-1, 1005-5-3, 1005-8-la (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976-77); IND. CODE § 35-13-
4-1 (1975); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (Baldwin 1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30
(West Supp. 1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 413 (Supp. 1975); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-
3-19, 97-3-21, 97-25-55, 97-17-20 (Supp. 1975); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.009, 559.005
(Vernon Supp. 1976); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 94-5-105 (Spec. Crim. Code Supp.
1976); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-401, 29-2521 to 29-2523 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 200.030 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1 (1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-2
(Supp. 1975 ); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 60.06 (McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN STAT. § 14-17
(Supp. 1975); OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.02-2929.04 (Anderson 1975); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 701.1-701.3 (West Supp. 1975-1976); 1974 PA. LAws, ACT. No. 46; R.I.
GEN. LAws § 11-23-2 (Supp. 1975); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-52 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1975);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2402, 39-2406 (1975); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1903 (a)
(Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-206, 76-3-207, 76-5-202 (Supp. 1975); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-10, 18.2-31 (1976); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.-32.045, 9A.32.046
(Supp. 1975); Wyo. STAT. § 6-54 (Supp. 1975).
29 E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (West 1974) (then required the death penalty
to be imposed whenever jury finds defendant guilty of first-degree murder); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (required the death penalty to be imposed whenever
jury finds defendant guilty of first-degree murder); OfHo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03,
2929.04 (Baldwin 1975) (death penalty mandatory for defendant found guilty of aggra-
vated murder unless the trial judge found one of three mitigating factors).
30 E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1101 (1972) (bifurcated trial, judge orjury must find at
least one of ten aggravating circumstances before returning death sentence, judge or
jury may refuse to impose the sentence of death even if aggravating circumstances
found, automatic appeal); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (1) (West Supp. 1976-1977) (Judge
must weigh eight aggravating circumstances against seven mitigating circumstances to
determine whether to impose death penalty, automatic appeal); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 19.03 (Vernon 1974) (Bifurcated trial, requires finding of aggravating circumstances,
mitigating circumstances may be presented).
Under the guided discretionary death penalty statutes, the sentencer has the power
to balance the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances and to
impose the death penalty when the aggravating circumstances outweighe the mitigating
circumstances. The Model Penal Code lists many examples of what should constitute
aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances. Some aggravating circum-
stances are: (a) the murder was committed by a defendant under a sentence of imprison-
ment; (b) the defendant knowingly creates a great risk of death to many persons (c) the
murder was committed for pecuniary gain. Some mitigating circumstances are: (a) the
defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity; (b) the murder was com-
mitted while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance; (c) the defendant acted under duress or under domination of another per-
son. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 n.44 (1976) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962)).
31 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
32 Id. at 169.
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the application of the death penalty to one who committed murder
was proportionate: "[W]e cannot say that the punishment is invaria-
bly disproportionate to the crime. It is an extreme sanction, suitable
to the most extreme of crimes." 33 The Gregg Court also explained
that the proportionality test required the Court to "look to objective
indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction."'3 4
However, as the Court felt that "public perceptions" were not con-
clusive, it actively retained its right to determine whether the death
penalty was excessive punishment in a particular case. In a series of
decisions handed down that same year, the Supreme Court struck
down the mandatory death penalty statutes because they did not al-
low for an individualized consideration of each particular defen-
dant.3 5 It upheld the discretionary statutes because these statutes
required lower courts to consider each defendant's culpability on a
case-by-case determination.3 6
In 1977, the Court used the balancing test to find that the death
penalty was an excessive punishment for the crime of rape.3 7 The
Court examined the history behind the death penalty, examples of
legislatively authorized use of the death penalty, international opin-
ion regarding the death penalty, and the sentencing decisions made
by juries, and found that the death sentence for rape was a dispro-
portionate punishment that violated the eighth amendment.38 One
33 Id. at 187.
34 Id. at 173.
35 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) ("Given that the imposition of death
by public authority is so profoundly different from all other penalties, we cannot avoid
the conclusion that an individualized decision is essential in capital cases.... The non-
availability of corrective or modifying mechanisms with respect to an executed capital
sentence underscores the need for individualized consideration as a constitutional re-
quirement in imposing the death sentence."); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
304 (1976) ("While the prevailing practice of individualizing sentencing determinations
generally reflects simply enlightened policy rather than a constitutional imperative, we
believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment requires consideration of the character and record of the individual of-
fender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable
part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.") (citation omitted); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333 (1976) ("The constitutional vice of mandatory death sen-
tence statutes-lack of focus on the circumstances of the particular offense and the char-
acter and propensities of the offender-is not resolved by Louisiana's limitation of first-
degree murder to various categories of killings.").
36 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg
428 U.S. 153.
37 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
38 Id. at 592. The Court wrote that the penalty of death for the crime of rape "is
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is there-
fore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment." The
Court finally addressed the concern raised in Powell v. Texas about the necessity of defer-
ring to the standards of state legislatures and others when it declared: "the Constitution
contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question
of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 597.
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year later, in Lockett v. Ohio,3 9 the Supreme Court reversed a death
sentence for a non-triggerman involved in a felony murder because
the state death penalty statute did not "permit the type of individu-
alized consideration of mitigating factors ... required by the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases."'40 The Court found
that in capital cases, the need to treat the defendant "with that de-
gree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual" compelled
"individualized consideration. ' 41
C. Death Penalty Jurisprudence and Enmund: Intent to Kill is a
Necessary Prerequisite to the Imposition of the Death
Penalty
1. The Majority and Dissenting Opinions
In 1982, the Supreme Court in Enmund v. Florida42 used a bal-
ancing test to decide whether the sentence of death for a non-trig-
german defendant who was involved in a felony where a murder
took place is constitutional.43 In the 4-1-4 decision,44 the Court de-
cided that in the case of a defendant who "neither took life, at-
tempted to take life, nor intended to take life,"' 45 imposing the death
penalty violates the eighth amendment.46 The Court thus held that
in order to impose the death sentence, the non-triggerman defen-
dant must intend the murder of the decedent.47
39 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
40 Id. at 606.
41 Id. at 605.
42 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
43 The defendant, Earl Enmund, was a passenger in a car that Sampson and Jea-
nette Armstrong drove. They all proceeded to the Kersey farmhouse where Sampson
and Jeanette got out and went to the farmhouse with the intention of robbing the Ker-
seys. It is unclear whether Enmund knew about their intentions. At some point during
the robbery the Armstrongs decided to kill the Kerseys, an elderly couple. At no point
during this time did Enmund leave the car. Enmund did drive the car away from the
farmhouse after Sampson and Jeanette murdered the Kerseys. Id. at 783-84. The Flor-
ida Supreme Court noted that while Enmund did not directly participate in the killing,
the jury could have found that he was waiting by the car ready to help the robbers. The
dissenting opinion states that Enmund had planned the armed robbery of the Kersey's.
Id. at 824 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
44 Justice White wrote the plurality opinion of the Court, joined byJustice Marshall,
Justice Stevens, and Justice Blackmun. Justice Brennan concurred, writing that the
death penalty violated the cruel and unusual penalty clause under any circumstances.
Justice O'Connor dissented joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice
Rhenquist.
45 Id. at 787.
46 The Court indicated in a footnote that it need not reach the question of whether
or not the degree of the defendant's involvement in the murder was enough to satisfy
the eighth amendment. Id. at n.4.
47 The Enmund Court did not define the word "intent." In Cabana v. Bullock, 474
U.S. 376, 386-87 (1986), the Court stated that the eighth amendment does not require
that the jury actually determine the felony murderer's state of mind-merely that the
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The Supreme Court in Enmund used the Coker v. Georgia balanc-
ing test.48 The Court began its analysis by examining society's views
of the crime and punishment. The Court weighed this factor by
looking to state and federal legislation concerning the death pen-
alty. Out of thirty-six jurisdictions that authorized the death pen-
alty, the Court found that only eight jurisdictions authorized the
death penalty for participation in a robbery where another robber
kills.49 The Court stated that at most "only about a third of Ameri-
can jurisdictions would ever permit a defendant who somehow par-
ticipated in a robbery where a murder occurred to be sentenced to
die."' 50 The Court felt that this legislative judgment rejected the
death penalty for cases such as Enmund's.
The Court then looked to jury rejections of the death penalty
for accomplice liability in felony murder cases. Of those executed
for homicide between 1964 and 1982, only 6 out of 362 were non-
triggerman felony murderers.5 ' And of 739 inmates under
sentences of death for homicide as of October 1, 1981, only three
were sentenced to die absent a finding that they killed, participated
in the scheme to kill the victim, or solicited someone else to kill the
victim. 52 These facts led the Court to conclude that "the statistics
... are adequately tailored to demonstrate that juries-and perhaps
prosecutors as well-consider death a disproportionate penalty for
those who fall within [the defendant's] category.153
The Court next decided that it needed to resolve whether the
eighth amendment allows the imposition of the death penalty in a
case where the defendant did not himself kill, attempt to kill, or in-
tend that a killing take place. Citing Gregg v. Georgia,54 the Court
explained that the death penalty should be applied only in situations
where it would serve retributive or deterrent goals. Because the
Court believed that only intentional murders could be deterred, the
Court stated that" 'capital punishment can serve as a deterrent only
state's appellate process need yield a determination that the defendant possessed the
requisite intent to kill.
48 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
49 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 789. In four states, felony murder was not a capital offense
(Missouri, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Washington). Eleven other states required
some form of culpable mental state. In eight of the eleven intent was required (Ala-
bama, Illinois, Louisiana, New Mexico, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Virginia) and in the other
three, reckless or extreme indifference to human life was required before the death pen-
alty could be imposed (Arkansas, Delaware, Kentucky). Id. at 789-90.
50 Id. at 792.
51 Id. at 794.
52 Id. at 795
53 Id. at 796.
54 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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when murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation." 55
Enmund did not meet the second justification for the death pen-
altym-retribution-because, as the Court said, "[plutting Enmund to
death to avenge two killings that he did not commit and had no in-
tention of committing or causing does not measurably contribute to
the retributive end of ensuring that the criminal gets his just
deserts." 56 Because the lower court did not meet these two justifi-
cations, and because the Court believed that most legislative and
jury decisions showed that society rejected capital punishment in
cases such as Enmund's, the Court found that imposition of the
death penalty against a non-triggerman who did not intend to kill
violated the eighth amendment.57
Justice O'Conner, writing in dissent,58 argued that the balanc-
ing analysis would support the imposition of death in this case and
that the majority holding "interferes with state criteria for assessing
legal guilt by recasting intent as a matter of federal constitutional
law." 59 The dissent examined the history of the balancing analysis
and essentially concluded that it prohibited the imposition of the
death penalty when the magnitude of the punishment was out of
proportion to the harm inflicted upon the victim. 60 While this is the
same standard that the majority used, the dissent reached a dramati-
cally different result. Justice O'Connor examined the jury statistics
that the majority used to show that society rejected the imposition
of the death penalty upon one convicted of felony murder, and pro-
claimed that the meaning of the statistics were "not entirely rele-
vant" because they may merely show that juries are cautious in
imposing the death penalty.6 1 She then considered the same state
statutes that the majority used in its argument to conclude that soci-
ety still "embrace[s] capital punishment for [felony murder]." 62
55 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 484
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
56 Id. at 801.
57 Id. at 782. The dissent criticized the majority on two grounds. First, that the
Court's opinion needlessly violated the states' power to sentence criminals implicit in
federalism: "[Tioday's holding interferes with state criteria for assessing legal guilt by
recasting intent as a matter of federal constitutional law." Id. at 802. Second, that the
statistics used by the majority were isolated and not particularly relevant. Id. at 818-20.
See also Note, Enmund v. Florida: The Supreme Court's Subjective Policy of Death Penalty Limi-
tation, 1983 DET. C.L. REV. 965, 976-77 (authored by Katharine L. Bradin) (jury and
death row statistics supporting the conclusion that society rejects the death penalty for
non-triggerman felony murderers may not necessarily be relevant in supporting such a
conclusion).
58 Joined by ChiefJustice Burger, and Justices Powell and Rehnquist.
59 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 802.
60 Id. at 815.
61 Id. at 819.
62 Id. at 823.
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The heart of the dissenting opinion revolves around the belief that
other factors beside "intent to kill" may be measured into the bal-
ancing approach with the same weight as "intent to kill." Thus, the
dissent writes "mens rea ... is not so critical a factor in determining
blameworthiness as to require a finding of intent to kill in order to
impose the death penalty for felony murder."'63
2. Critique of the Majority Opinion
The Enmund Court held that a non-triggerman who did not take
life, attempt to take life, or intend to take life may not be sentenced
to death. This holding is presented in a confusing and poorly ar-
ticulated manner.64 The "intent" requirement never is defined in a
precise manner. Indeed, the Supreme Court defined the "intent"
requirement within the actual Enmund decision in so many different
ways that it is not clear what level of mental culpability is actually
needed before a non-triggerman involved in a felony murder may
be sentenced to death. The White plurality variously defined intent
as: intent to take life,65 intent that "lethal force will be em-
ployed,"' 66 "contemplat[ion] that life would be taken," 67 "contem-
plat[ion] that lethal force will be employed by others, 68 or
"anticipat[ion] that lethal force would or might be used." 69
The Court put a further gloss on the intent requirement when it
stated that if the likelihood of killing in the underlying felony was
"so substantial that one should share the blame for the killing,"
then the intent standard might be lower.70 However, the Court also
suggested that the defendant must have the requisite intent of "pre-
meditation" and "deliberation. ' 71
Because the holding in Enmund is so unclear, courts and com-
63 Id. at 825.
64 For a discussion of the many problems implicit in the Enmund decision, see Note,
Jurisprudential Confusion in Eighth Amendment Analysis, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 357, 370-71
(1984) (authored by John C. Shawde) ("Enmund promotes confusion in several areas,"
including whether the death penalty could constitutionally be applied to an accomplice
who intended the victim to be killed but did not participate in the killing.).
65 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 787, 793, 795, 796, 798, 799.
66 Id. at 797.
67 Itt at 801.
68 Id at 799.
69 Id. at 788. For a fuller discussion of the Supreme Court's struggle to define the
intent requirement in Enmund and a discussion of the possible interpretations, see Note,
Imposing the Death Sentence for Felony Murder on a Non-Triggerman, 37 STAN. L. REV. 857,
865-66, 869-879 (1985) (authored by Douglas W. Schwartz). In addition to failing to
define "intent," the court left the definitions of "lethal force," "contemplate," and "an-
ticipate" unnecessarily vague. See Note, supra note 3, at 370-71.
70 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799.
71 Id. (" 'capital punishment can serve as a deterrent only when murder is the result
of premeditation and deliberation' ") (quoting Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463,
484 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
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mentators have inconsistently viewed the requirements of Enmund as
ranging from necessitating a finding of anticipation that lethal force
would be used to a complete bar on the imposition of the death
penalty for those convicted under a felony murder statute,72 as well
as conclusions falling everywhere in between. 73
Many lower federal courts have decided that Enmund requires
more than simply that the defendant anticipate that lethal force
might be used or that lives might be taken. The Fourth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits have adopted a strict "intent to kill" doctrine,74 while
the Eleventh Circuit appears to be torn between a narrow reading of
Enmund and a more permissive reading.75 The Fifth Circuit epito-
mizes the confusion that lower courts have had in trying to apply the
Enmund standard by interpreting the intent requirement in different
ways. In some decisions the court requires that non'triggermen
72 Comment, 29 N.Y.L. Scn. L. REV. 179, 204 (1984) (authored by Peter R.
Schwartz).
73 Comment, Intent after Enmund v. Florida: Not Just Another Aggravating Circumstance,
65 B.U.L. REV. 809, 810 (1985) (authored by Margaret Carmody Jenkins) (defendant
needs intent to commit homicide); Comment, Eighth Amendment Prohibits Imposition of
Death Penalty on Accomplice to a Felony Murder, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 253, 254 (1983) (authored
by L.K.S.) (intent to kill); Note, Cabana v. Bullock: The Proper Tribunal-The Supreme Court
Revisits Enmund v. Florida, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1023, 1030 (1986) (authored by Deborah
Sachs) (the Supreme Court did not adequately specify the level of intent); Note, Enmund
v. Florida: The Constitutionality of Imposing the Death Penalty Upon a Co-felon in Felony Murder,
32 DE PAUL L. REV. 713, 728 (1982) (authored by Laura L. Keiton) (defendant must have
killed or intended to kill); Note, supra note 3, at 370-71 (defendant must have killed,
attempted to kill, or intended to kill); Note, Enmund v. Florida: A Nail in the Coffin of the
Felony Murder Rule, 5 GLENDALE L. REV. 248, 254 (1983) (defendant must have killed,
attempted to kill or intended that lethal force be employed); Note, Enmund v. Florida, 9
NEW ENG.J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 292, 302 (1983) (authored by David V. Weiner)
(defendant must kill or intend killing to occur).
74 See Andrews v. Shulsen, 802 F.2d. 1256, 1274 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 1091 (1988); McKenzie v. Risley, 801 F.2d 1519, 1530 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding of
intent is condition precedent to the imposition of the death penalty), reh'g granted, 815
F.2d 1323 (9th Cir.), vacated in part, 842 F.2d 1525, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 250 (1988));
Hyman v. Aiken, 777 F.2d 938, 940 (4th Cir. 1985) (imposition of the death penalty is
prohibited unless a finding is made that the defendant killed, attempted to kill, or in-
tended to kill),judgnent vacated, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986); United States v. Schell, 692 F.2d
672, 675 (10th Cir. 1982) (death penalty unconstitutional when applied to felony mur-
der defendant who did not kill or intend to kill). The Court in Andrews affirmed the
defendant's conviction, saying that the nature of the jury instructions precluded his con-
viction without a finding "that he intended the murders."); but cf Chaney v. Brown, 730
F.2d 1334, 1336 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1090 (1984) (defendant must kill, at-
tempt to kill, or contemplate that life be taken before death penalty can be imposed).
75 See White v. Wainwright, 809 F.2d 1478, 1481, 1484 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 483
U.S. 1044 (1987) (The court seems to accept the defendant's contemplation that life be
taken or that lethal force be used as satisfying the intent requirement.); Fleming v.
Kemp, 748 F.2d 1435, 1454 (11th Cir. 1984), reh'g denied, 765 F.2d 1123 (11th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1058 (1986) (intent to kill is satisfied by the defendant doing
one of four things: (1) directly committing the crime; (2) intentionally causing someone
to commit the crime; (3) intentionally aiding or abetting in the commission of the crime;
(4) intentionally encouraging another to commit the crime).
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have personal intent to kill,7 6 and in other decisions the court
merely requires that the non-triggermen anticipate or contemplate
using lethal force or taking lives. 77 State courts seem split as well in
deciding the intent standard necessary to satisfy Enmund.78
While there is no unanimous agreement about what Enmund re-
quires, the strongest trend among the commentaries and the lower
courts is that Enmund at least requires a determination that the de-
fendant specifically intended for the victim to die.79 In late 1986 the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to Tison v. Arizona, perhaps in part
to resolve the confusion caused by the ambiguous holding in En-
mund. The Court essentially overruled Enmund and lessened the
standard of culpability necessary for imposition of the death pen-





On July 30, 1978, three brothers, Donald, Ricky, and Raymond
Tison, implemented a plan their relatives had designed"0 to free
76 See Kirkpatrick v. Blackburn, 777 F.2d 272, 286 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1178 (1988) (Enmund requires that "'the defendant either participated directly in
the killing or personally had an intent to commit murder' ") (quoting Reddix v.
Thigpen, 728 F.2d 705, 708 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984)) (court reversed
because there was not a "specific finding that [the defendant] either killed, attempted to
kill, or intended a killing or the use of lethal force.").
77 SeeJohnson v. McCotter, 804 F.2d 300, 302 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1042 (1987) (Enmund requires that a defendant must at least have contemplated the "act
of an accomplice" in the killing); Wingo v. Blackburn, 786 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1042 (1987) (Enmund requires a finding of "an intention or contempla-
tion that life be taken.").
78 People v. Garcia, 36 Cal. 3d 539, 684 P.2d 826, 205 Cal. Rptr. 265, 275 (1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1229 (1985) (defendant must intend to kill or intend to aid in the
killing), rev'd, People v. Malone, 47 Cal. 3d 1, 762 P.2d 1249, 252 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1988);
Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983) (de-
fendant must intend to kill or contemplate the use of lethal force), rev'd, People v. An-
derson, 38 Cal. 3d 58, 694 P.2d 1149, 210 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1985).
79 This determination may be made by the jury or the judge or even the State's
highest court if it finds, upon review of the trial record, evidence sufficient to conclude
that the intent requirement was satisfied. See Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 392
(1986) (eighth amendment does not require that a jury make the findings required by
Enmund. The findings need merely be made by "some appropriate tribunal-be it an
appellate court, a trial judge, or a jury.").
80 Gary Tison, the boys' father, Dorothy Tison, the boys' mother, Joseph Tison, the
boys' uncle, and other relatives helped to plan the escape. Originally, the three boys
were not going to participate in the breakout, but after assurances from their father that
no one would be hurt, the boys joined the plan. Indeed, no shots were fired in the
escape. Tison, 481 U.S. 137, 139 (1987).
For a detailed description of the events that led up to the murder and convictions of
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their father, Gary Tison, from prison.8' That morning the three
men entered the Arizona State Prison at Florence with an ice chest
loaded with guns and broke their father and his cell mate, Randy
Greenawalt,8 2 out of prison. The five spent two nights at an isolated
house, and then switched cars and headed towards Flagstaff, Ari-
zona. Along the way two tires blew out on their car (a Lincoln),
forcing the group to flag down a passing car in order to complete
the escape. Raymond stood alone by the side of the road and at-
tempted to flag down a car. Soon a Mazda, containing John and
Donnelda Lyons, their infant son, and their niece, pulled over to
render assistance. The other members of the group then sur-
rounded the Lyonses.
Raymond drove both cars off the highway and into the desert.
The Tison's gear was placed into the Mazda, and then the Lincoln
was driven further into the desert and rendered inoperable by a
shotgtin blast to the radiator. John Lyons begged the Tisons not to
kill him, and Gary Tison stated that he was "thinking about it."83
While everyone was gathered around the Lincoln, Gary Tison told
his sons to go back to the Mazda and get ajug of water for the Lyons
family. While the three brothers were getting the water, they heard
a series of gunshots.8 4 Gary Tison and Randy Greenawalt had killed
the Lyons family.
Several days later the group ran into a roadblock in Pinal
County, Arizona. Ricky Tison, Raymond Tison, and Randy Greena-
walt were captured and tried for the capital murder of the Lyons
family, armed robbery, kidnapping and theft of a motor vehicle.8 5
They were each convicted separately under an Arizona felony-
murder law,8 6 and the trial judge sentenced them to death. 7 Ricky
and Raymond Tison were only nineteen and eighteen years old
the Tisons, see generally Tison, 481 U.S. at 139-41; Brief for the Petitioners at 2-13;
Brief for Respondent at 1-8.
81 Gary Tison was serving a life sentence for killing a guard in an attempted prison
break.
82 Randy Greenawalt was serving a life sentence for murder.
83 Tison, 481 U.S. at 140.
84 There is some ambiguity as to how close the brothers were to the Mazda when
the actual shooting took place. The defendants argue that they were either at the Mazda
or headed to the Lincoln, Petitioner's Brief at 4, while the prosecution argued that they
were positioned back where they had been before going to get the water, Respondent's
Brief at 2. See also Comment, Felony-Murder Death Sentence: The Tison Brother's Intent to Kill,
27 ARIZ. L. REV. 889, 891 (1985) (authored by Darlyre Gallaway) (author, citing Ricky
Tison's February 1, 1979 statement, at 36, states that Ricky and Raymond had returned
from the Lincoln and had given John Lyons a drink of water right before the Lyons
family was murdered).
85 Donald Tison was shot in the head and subsequently died due to the injuries.
Gary Tison escaped, but died from exposure in the desert soon after.
86 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-452 (1956) (repealed 1978).
87 The brothers were sentenced to death even though the Chief Adult Probation
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when the murders took place, and neither had any prior felony
convictions.88
B. The Arizona State Court Opinion
On direct review, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the deci-
sion of the trial court,89 although the Arizona Supreme Court found
that the defendants (1) did not "specifically intend" the deaths; (2)
did not plot in advance that the homicides would take place; and (3)
did not actually pull the triggers on the guns which inflicted the fatal
wounds. The United States Supreme Court denied the defendants'
petition for certiorari.90 Two years later the defendants made a col-
lateral attack on their death sentences by filing for post-conviction
relief alleging that the imposition of the death sentence would vio-
late Enmund v. Florida. The trial court denied the petitions, and the
Arizona Supreme Court, in a divided decision, held that the intent
requirement of Enmund was satisfied because Raymond Tison
"could anticipate the use of lethal force during [the] attempt to flee
confinement. '"9' In Ricky's case, the court held that Enmund's intent
requirement was fulfilled because, "[i]ntent to kill includes the situa-
tion in which the defendant intended, contemplated, or anticipated
that lethal force would or might be ... taken in accomplishing the
underlying felony." 92
The Arizona Supreme Court essentially reformulated the En-
mund requirement into a "species of foreseeability."93 To satisfy
this "foreseeability" test, the prosecution had only to prove that the
defendants anticipated that lethal force might be used. The United
States Supreme Court then granted certiorari to decide whether or
not the Arizona Supreme Court's decision comported with the re-
quirements of Enmund.94
Officer would not recommend the death penalty. Indeed, the Court-appointed clinical
psychologist told the court that the boys could be rehabilitated. Petitioner's Brief at 8-9.
88 In fact, their only previous brush with the law involved their conviction for petty
theft of a case of beer. Petitioner's Brief at n.2.
89 State v. (Ricky Wayne) Tison, 129 Ariz. 526, 545, 633 P.2d 335, 354 (1981).
90 Tison, 459 U.S. 882 (1982).
91 State v. (Raymond Curtis) Tison, 142 Ariz. 454, 456, 690 P.2d 755, 757 (1982).
The court split 3-2.
92 State v. (Ricky Wayne) Tison, 142 Ariz. 446, 447, 690 P.2d 747, 748 (1982). In a
sharply worded dissent,Justice Feldman and Vice ChiefJustice Gordon wrote: "[Tihere
is no direct evidence that either of the brothers intended to kill, actually participated in
the killing or was aware that lethal force would be used against the kidnap victims."
State v. (Ricky Wayne) Tison, 142 Ariz. 446, 451 (1982) (Feldman, J. concurring in part
and dissenting in part; Gordon, V.C.J., joining in the dissent).
93 Tison, 481 U.S. 137, 150 (1987).
94 Id at 158.
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C. The Supreme Court Opinion
1. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the sentence of
death for the Tison brothers because the Arizona Supreme Court
erroneously used the Enmund intent standard. 95 According to the
majority opinion, the Arizona Supreme Court did not attempt to ar-
gue that the facts of the case supported "an inference of 'intent' in
the traditional sense," but instead broadened the Enmund intent re-
quirement into a "restatement of the felony-murder rule itself."96
Any participant in a felony could have anticipated or contemplated
that lethal force might be used in accomplishing the underlying fel-
ony and therefore that person, by anticipating or contemplating the
possibility of lethal force, met the Enmund "intent" requirement
under the Arizona Supreme Court's formulation.
The Supreme Court rejected this reformulation of the Enmund
"intent" standard and stated that it accepted as true that the defen-
dants did not "intend" to kill the Lyons family. 97 At this point, the
Court could simply have reversed the death sentences against the
Tison brothers in accordance with Enmund; however, the Court pro-
ceeded to create a completely new substantive standard for capital
liability.
While the Court stated that defendants did not fall within the
"intent to kill" category of felony murderers for which Enmund
would allow execution, the Court also ruled that the defendants did
not fall within the category of offenders for whom Enmund would
preclude execution: those who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend
to kill. Instead, the Supreme Court created a new category of of-
fenders-those who have a "major participation in the felony com-
mitted, combined with reckless indifference to human life .. .
The Court stated that for some offenders, a determination of reck-
less disregard for human life, combined with the conduct that causes
the lethal result, is equivalent to "intent to kill." 99
The Court then reviewed its own decision in Enmund and stated
95 481 U.S. 137 (1987). Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Powell, and Scalia. Justice Brennan dissented,
joined in part by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
96 Id. at 150.
97 The Tison Court used "intend" in the Enmund sense. Id. at 151 ("Petitioners do
not fall within the 'intent to kill' category of felony murderers for which Enmund explic-
itly finds the death penalty permissible under the Eighth Amendment.").
98 Id. at 158.
99 Id. at 157. The Court cites the Model Penal Code as well as the common law as
two examples where reckless behavior culminating in a lethal end result is treated the
same as purposeful and knowing killing. However, the Court does not address the fact
that it is the principal, and not an accomplice, for whom this equivalency exists.
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that the reasoning in Enmund did not apply to the defendants in Ti-
son because they belonged to a middle category of offenders. The
majority drew support for its new standard from a quote taken from
the Enmund opinion which suggests that if the defendant were to
participate in crimes in which the risk of death were substantial, then
the defendant should share in the blame for the killing.100 The ma-
jority's reliance on this language, however, is misplaced because by
its own language Enmund meant to prevent the sentence of death for
anyone who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill. The Tison
brothers, by the Court's own admission, did none of these acts. 10 1
Moreover, the majority opinion does not even discuss how it derives
the various "categories" of felony murderers; it merely states that
Enmund "explicitly" dealt with only two subsets of all felony murder-
ers; at one extreme there was Enmund, a minor actor in an armed
robbery, who could not be sentenced to death, and at the other ex-
treme there was the felony murderer who actually killed, attempted
to kill, or intended to kill, and who could be sentenced to death. 10 2
Thus, between these two extremes, the Court found a middle cate-
gory. Within this middle category were defendants who participated
to a major degree in the underlying felony and who exhibited a reck-
less indifference toward human life, and who thus could be sen-
tenced to death.
Next, the Court considered state death penalty statutes. The
Tison Court concluded that the statutes "powerfully suggest[] that
our society does not reject the death penalty as grossly excessive
under these circumstances."1 03 The Enmund Court used essentially
those same death penalty statutes in its determination that the death
penalty should not be applied to the non-triggerman. 10 4 The major-
ity then noted that a number of lower courts interpreting Enmund
had upheld the imposition of the death penalty in circumstances
where aggravated felony murders took place but did not apply the
strict interpretation of "intent to kill."' 105 This evidence, the Court
said, was enough to demonstrate a consensus that "substantial par-
ticipation in a violent felony under circumstances likely to result in
100 Id. at 149 (quoting Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799 ("[ilt would be very different if the
likelihood of a killing in course of a robbery were so substantial that one should share
the blame for the killing if he somehow participated in the felony.")).
101 Id. at 151 ("Petitioners do not fall within the 'intent to kill' category of felony
murderers for which Enmund explicitly finds the death penalty permissible under the
Eighth Amendment.").
102 Ia at 149 ("Enmund explicitly dealt with two distinct subsets of all felony murders
in assessing whether Enmund's sentence was disproportional under the Eighth
Amendment.").
103 Id at 154 (emphasis in original).
104 Id. at 152 n.4.
105 Id. at 154.
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the loss of innocent human life may justify the death penalty even
absent an "intent to kill."' 0 6 The Supreme Court thus used the fail-
ure of lower courts to apply accurately the dictates of Enmund to
justify the expansion of the Enmund intent to kill requirement.
The Court remanded Tison for a hearing in accordance with its
new standard that "major participation in the felony committed,
combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to
satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement."'' 0 7 The Supreme Court
stated that the Tisons fell well within the range of this new category
and could be sentenced to death in compliance with the re-defined
Enmund standard.' 08
2. The Dissent
Justice Brennan, dissenting, characterized the conviction of the
Tisons for first degree murder as an application of the felony-mur-
der rule.'0 9 Under the felony-murder doctrine, Ricky and Raymond
Tison were liable for the murders that occurred during the robbery,
regardless of whether they actually intended or committed murder.
The actions and intent of their co-felons was imputed to them. i 0
The dissent labeled the felony-murder doctrine as a "curious" "liv-
ing fossil" surviving from an era in which all felonies were punish-
able by death."' The majority's broadening of the death penalty
justifications from intent to degree of culpability upset the dissent.
Without intent, the degree of personal culpability must necessarily
be minimal.
Brennan concluded that the Enmund Court had, in formulating
the personal intent to kill requirement, rejected the felony-murder
106 Id.
107 Id. at 158.
108 Id. Following remand from the Supreme Court the Arizona Supreme Court re-
manded the case to the Yuma County Superior Court for resentencing. The Superior
Court judge ruled that both Ricky and Raymond Tison possessed a "reckless indiffer-
ence to human life," and resentenced each to death without permitting either to present
any additional mitigating circumstances. Both defendants appealed. On May 2, 1989
the Arizona Supreme Court sitting en banc vacated the sentences and remanded for an
evidentiary hearing on "Enmund/Tison issues" and for resentencing. 774 P.2d 805,
806 (Ariz. 1989).
109 Justice Marshall joined Justice Brennan's dissent in its entirety. Justices Black-
mun and Stevens joined Justice Brennan's dissent, except for the portion in which he
repeated his view that all forms of capital punishment were cruel and unusual.
110 Although the majority did not discuss it, this imputation of intent from the prin-
cipal to the co-felon seems to violate the "individualized consideration" mandated by
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978). See Tison, 481 U.S. at 160 n.3 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan would leave it open to the state courts to consider the con-
stitutionality of Arizona's aggravating factors).
111 See Tison, 481 U.S. at 160 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also W. LAFAVE & A.
Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw 560-61 (1972).
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doctrine."12 Moreover, the dissent stated that Enmund "cast consid-
erable doubt on the constitutionality of the death sentences im-
posed on [the defendants] in this case" 113 because the defendants
had no intent to kill. Next, the dissenting opinion argued that after
concluding that the Arizona Supreme Court had misconstrued En-
mund, the Court should have vacated the sentences of the defen-
dants and reversed the judgment rather than "announc[ing] a new
substantive standard for capital liability." 114 Brennan explained
that the actions of the Tisons amounted to no more than the actions
of Enmund. Because the Tisons were only as culpable as Enmund,
Brennan felt that the Tisons should not be put to death. Indeed,
Brennan asserted that the Court should have taken the defendant's
mental state (no intent to kill) into consideration before announcing
that the defendants' mental states demonstrated a reckless disregard
for human life. 1 5 In addition, Brennan lashed out at the majority
for failing to use the proportionality analysis required by precedent
and implicit in the Constitution. 1 6 Brennan stated that it was unfair
to punish the defendants who did not kill or intend to kill as harshly
as those "whose culpability is greatest"-the actual killers of the Ly-
ons family." 17
Justice Brennan concluded that the Tison decision was inconsis-
tent not only with Enmund, but also with the only legitimate justifica-
tions for the imposition of capital punishment-deterrence and
retribution." 8 The majority opinion at best addressed only one as-
pect of the proportionality test-the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the punishment-and ignored the other two. 1'9
112 Tison, 481 U.S. at 162 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The [Enmund] Court then ex-
plained, and rejected, the felony-murder doctrine as a theory of capital culpability.").
113 Id.
114 Id. at 163.
115 Id at 163-68.
116 Id. at 168.
117 Id at 171.
118 Id. at 172-73.
119 As announced in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983), the proportionality
test under the eighth amendment has three prongs: "(i) the gravity of the offense and
the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions." See supra note 3.
Brennan also disputed the results of the majority's survey of state statutes authoriz-
ing the death penalty for felony murder. Rather than supporting the majority opinion,
this survey data, Brennan claimed, was contrary to the Court's view because it showed
that only a minority of the statutes would authorize the imposition of the death penalty
in this case. Brennan marshalled further evidence that the country and the world do not
support executing the type of defendant for which Tison would authorize the death pen-
alty. Tison, 481 U.S. at 177 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan cited statistics showing
that between 1954 and 1982 there were only 6 of 362 possible cases where a nontrig-
german felony murderer was executed. Indeed, of all those convicted of felony murder
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Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion also stated that Tison ex-
emplified an irrational system of justice. The system of justice the
majority imposed cannot rationally distinguish the few cases in
which the death penalty was applied from the majority of cases
where it was not. 20 Brennan concluded that the application of the
death penalty against non-triggermen who participate to a major ex-
tent in the underlying felony and who have a reckless indifference
toward human life is unconstitutional. Moreover, even if Tison were
the correct rule, Justice Brennan stated that the defendants could
not meet the Tison test because he did not believe that there was
enough evidence to prove that actions of the defendants demon-
strated reckless disregard toward human life.12'
III
ANALYSIS
A. Tison Cannot be Reconciled with Enmund
1. Tison Departs from the Substantive Policies Underlying Enmund
It is not possible to reconcile the Supreme Court's decision in
Tison v. Arizona with its decision five years earlier in Enmund v. Flor-
ida. Tison is essentially a refined and reworked version of the dissent
in Enmund. In Enmund, the dissent stated that a constitutionally al-
lowable imposition of the death penalty did not require a finding of
the defendant's intent. Rather, the defendant must possess "knowl-
edge that [the felony committed] .. .involve[s] substantial risk of
death or serious injury to other persons"' 122 and that the defendant
had to be a major participant in the felony. 123 The Tison Court cre-
ates an intermediate category of defendants by allowing the state to
execute a defendant who exhibits reckless disregard toward human
life and who participates to a great extent in the underlying felony.
Thus, Tison eliminates the Enmund intent requirement, as the En-
mund dissenting opinion would have liked, and in so doing increases
the likelihood that other defendants will be eligible for capital
punishment.
In addition to expanding dramatically the area in which the
state constitutionally can apply the death penalty, Tison also departs
from the substantive reasoning underlying Enmund. The Enmund
Court required a determination of intent to kill because the death
in the last quarter century, not one has been executed who did not kill, attempt to kill, or
intend the death of the victim. Id. at 179-80 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 171.
121 See id. at 179.
122 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 825 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
123 Id at 825-31.
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penalty is a severe and irrevocable punishment to be used only as a
last resort where the criminal actions of the defendant constitute so
"grievous an affront to humanity" that they demand the imposition
of-the death penalty. 124 The Enmund Court refused to impute the
actions or intent of another to the defendant because its theory of
the eighth amendment revolved around the defendant's personal
culpability. The Tison Court had no such qualms. Because the Tison
Court viewed the death penalty as a legitimate punishment to pro-
tect society from criminals who knowingly take acts which might re-
sult in the loss of life, 125 the Tison Court did not need to "narrowly
focus" on intent, but instead could look to the surrounding circum-
stances of a criminal's conduct. Culpability for the Tison Court
rested on a combination of knowledge and action. A defendant is
culpable if she acts with reckless disregard toward human life. The
Tison Court viewed this combination as equivalent to "purposeful
and knowing killing," 126 thus justifying the death penalty.
2. Tison's New Category of Defendants: Intention to Kill No
Longer Necessary
Enmund explicitly held that death is not a valid punishment
under the eighth and fourteenth amendments for ojie who neither
took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life. The hold-
ing of Enmund is unambiguous: those felony murderers who kill, at-
tempt to kill, or intend to kill may be put to death; those who do not,
may not.127 The Tison Court created a third category of felony mur-
der defendants and devised a new substantive standard by which to
judge this newly developed category. This category comprises de-
fendants who participated in the underlying felony to a major de-
gree and who acted with reckless indifference towards human life.
The Tison Court held that the state could constitutionally put indi-
viduals falling into this grouping to death without ever having to
meet the Enmund criteria.
Tison argues that Enmund explicitly dealt with only two distinct
subsets of all felony murderers, and that the Tison brothers did not
fit into either of the two subsets, but rather into a third. The third
category, however, is wholly illusory, created as a subterfuge to
evade the dictates of Enmund. There are only two possible, but un-
satisfying, explanations of where in Enmund this third category could
be found. The first stems from a footnote in Enmund which states:
"The petitioner argues a second question: whether the degree of
124 Id. at 797 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976)).
125 Tison, 481 U.S. at 157-58.
126 Id. at 158.
127 Enmund, 458 U.S. 781, 787, 796-99 (1982).
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Enmund's participation in the killings was given the consideration
required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. We need not
deal with this question."' 12 This could be construed by the Tison
Court to mean that the eighth amendment analysis would have been
different had Enmund's degree of participation in the killing been
greater or lesser. Under this construction, the Tison Court could,
consistent with Enmund, fashion a new substantive standard for the
defendant whose participation in the underlying felony exceeded
Enmund's. This analysis, however, does not survive careful scrutiny
for two reasons. First, the Tison Court never mentioned this foot-
note in its opinion, probably because the holding of Enmund pre-
cluded even a cursory examination into the extent of the
defendant's participation where the defendant did not kill, attempt
to kill, or intend to kill.' 29 Second, the Enmund opinion did not pro-
vide the slightest hint of an undefined third category of felony mur-
der defendants. Enmund provided a blanket prohibition against the
imposition of the death penalty in all cases where the non-trigger-
man did not possess the requisite intent requirement.
The Ton Court calls the Arizona Supreme Court's foreseeabil-
ity test-whether the defendant anticipated that lethal force might
be used in accomplishing the underlying felony' 30 -an unacceptable
definition of the intent to kill concept because it is "broader than
that described by the Enmund Court."' 31 The majority in Tison, how-
ever, goes to great lengths to show that killing with reckless indiffer-
ence toward human life is equivalent to killing with purpose and
knowledge, thus broadening Enmund's intent requirement.' 32 Just
as intent to kill is a highly culpable state allowing imposition of the
death penalty under Enmund, acting with reckless indifference to-
ward human life is a highly culpable state allowing a sentence of
death under Tison. Now, some individuals who do not meet the in-
tent to kill requirement of Enmund may still be put to death.
In concluding that the Tisons met the reckless indifference to-
wards human life requirement, the Court engaged in foreseeability
analysis. To determine whether a defendant had a mental state of
reckless indifference toward human life, the Court looked to see
whether the defendant "knowingly engag[ed] in criminal activities
128 Id. at 787.
129 This footnote creates a second hurdle for the prosecution to meet once it has
shown that the defendant has intended to kill. The prosecution must next show that the
defendant participated significantly enough in the killings that the imposition of the
death penalty would not conflict with the eighth amendment.
130 Tison, 481 U.S. at 150-51.
131 Id. at 150.
132 Id. at 157-58.
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known to carry a grave risk of death."133 Thus, the imputation of
"reckless disregard for human life" depends solely on a foreseeabil-
ity test, for the Court stated that reckless indifference toward human
life exists whenever one engages in conduct known to carry a grave
risk of death.134 The Court used foreseeability reasoning to show
not only that the Tison brothers acted with reckless indifference to-
ward human life, but also to show that they were major participants
in the underlying felony. The Court stated that "[they] could have
foreseen that lethal force might be used,"'1 5 and that "they both sub-
jectively appreciated that their acts were likely to result in the taking
of innocent life."' 36 Using as evidence the contention that the Ti-
son brothers could have or should have anticipated that lethal force
might be used, the Court concluded that the Tison brothers met
both prongs of the Tison test, and that the state may carry out their
death sentences if the Arizona State courts so decide. The Tison test
thus does not differ too much from the Arizona Supreme Court's
requirement that the defendant "contemplated, or anticipated that
lethal force would or might be used or that life would or might be
taken in accomplishing the underlying felony."' 37
3. The Enmund Requirement Applied to the Tison Facts
If the Tison Court would have strictly applied the Enmund intent
to kill requirement to the Tison brothers, the Court would have
found, as the dissenting Justices did, that the imposition of the
death penalty to the Tison brothers violated Edmund. The similari-
ties between Enmund's actions and the Tisons' actions are substan-
tial.138 Both were convicted of serious crimes which posed a serious
risk to human life-robbery and robbery/kidnapping. Enmund and
the Tisons were both convicted of murder despite the fact that they
did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill. No proof was offered
by the prosecution to show that Enmund or the Tisons killed or at-
tempted to kill the victims. The evidence tended to show that both
Enmund and the Tisons were not present when their companions
murdered the victims. Indeed, the evidence also showed that En-
mund and the Tisons did not even know that their companions were
going to kill the victims.
Several other factors combine to show that the Tisons were in
fact less culpable than Enmund. For instance, Enmund had been
133 Id at 157.
134 Id.
'35 Id. at 152 (emphasis added).
136 Id. (emphasis added).
137 State v. (Ricky Wayne) Tison, 142 Ariz. 446, 447, 690 P.2d 747, 748 (1982).
138 See Brief for the Petitioners at 17-19; Tison, 481 U.S. 137.
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convicted of a prior felony involving the use or threat of violence;' 3 9
the Tisons never had been convicted of a felony. While the Enmund
Court found that it had to reverse Enmund's conviction because the
evidence did not establish that Enmund intended to kill, the Tisons'
record includes a great deal of evidence that the Tisons affirmatively
did not intend to kill. 140 If the Supreme Court, or any of the lower
courts, had faithfully followed the precedent of Enmund, they would
have overturned the sentence of death imposed upon the Tisons.
Indeed, the Tison Court stated that the Tisons did not satisfy the
"intent" requirement of Enmund: "Petitioners [Ricky and Raymond
Tison] do not fall within the 'intent to kill' category of felony mur-
derers for which Enmund explicitly finds the death penalty permissi-
ble under the Eighth Amendment."' 14 1
4. The Tison Brothers Did Not Have the Requisite State of Mind of
"Reckless Indiference Toward Human Life"
The Supreme Court stated that the Tison "record would sup-
port a finding of the culpable mental state of reckless indifference to
human life."' 42 This statement, however, is questionable. Although
the defendants participated in the prison break and the kidnap-
ping/robbery of the Lyons family, no objective evidence indicated
that the defendants appreciated the possibility of their father and
Randy Greenawalt suddenly murdering the Lyons family. The de-
fendants merely acted in furtherance of the underlying felonies-
prison break, robbery, and kidnapping. The defendants' actions
were aimed at and consistent with these goals, and not murder.
A necessary element for the application of the death penalty is
the exhibition of reckless indifference toward human life. The pros-
ecution did not proffer independent evidence of state of mind. The
defendants' involvement in the underlying felonies served as the
sole proof of state of mind. The prosecution should have been re-
quired to prove a mental state of reckless indifference toward
human life based upon more than mere participation in the underly-
ing felony. The only evidence before the Court with respect to the
defendants' mental state was the Arizona Supreme Court's conclu-
sion, not supported by any facts, that the defendants could have an-
ticipated that lethal force might be used during the escape. The
Supreme Court should have remanded the case for a determination
139 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 785.
140 See Brief for the Petitioners at 18.
141 Tison, 481 U.S. at 151. The Court also said: "As petitioners point out, there is no
evidence that either Ricky or Raymond Tison took any act which he desired to, or was
substantially certain would cause death." Id at 150.
142 Id. at 151.
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on the question of the defendants' state of mind. The lower court
did not show that the defendants possessed this necessary element
of the Tison "reckless indifference toward human life" requirement.
Thus, the Supreme Court misinterpreted the facts of Tison when it
concluded that the Tisons could constitutionally be sentenced to
death.
B. Tison and the Lower Courts
Tison's impact upon lower court decisions is unpredictable be-
cause the Mon decision is ambiguous. The Supreme Court did not
define the requisite mens rea and conduct requirements necessary to
yield a constitutionally approved sentence of the death penalty
against a non-triggerman. The Supreme Court stated: "We will not
attempt to precisely delineate the particular types of conduct and
states of mind warranting imposition of the death penalty here."'143
The Court's failure to define adequately the new class of defendants
and its refusal to explain adequately the key elements in its decision
will allow for the discretionary application of Tison by lower courts,
and will result in a cacophony of opinions.1 44 Indeed, Tison's ambi-
guity is already causing diverging lower court decisions. In a recent
case, one court totally neglected consideration of the requirement
of major participation in the underlying felony. 145
Another feature of Tison is that the Supreme Court defined the
actions of the Tison brothers as "fall[ing] well within" the required
degree of participation of the felony.' 46 If, as the Court suggests,
the Tisons' action were more than sufficient to find that they met the
"major participation" requirement of the Tison test, then courts may
find that future defendants who participate in a felony to a lesser
degree satisfy the participation requirement. This will probably
lead to a collapse of the two prongs (major participation and reck-
less indifference to human life) into one.147 That is, if the defend-
143 Id. at 158.
144 The ambiguity of the Tison decision will give lower courts a great deal of discre-
tion in applying the ruling of Tison to future cases. Lower courts inevitably will adopt
different criteria to try and apply the standard announced in Tison. Splits in the circuits
and among the states will arise in applying Tison. An individual's life may depend on
which state and which circuit hears her case. Thus the Supreme Court will have to make
new decisions in this area in order to unify disparate and inequitable applications of
Tison.
145 Glass v. Butler, 820 F.2d 112, 113 (5th Cir. 1987) ("Tison ... refines the rule of
Enmund ... to provide that the eighth amendment does not prohibit the imposition of
the death penalty on one who does the killing, intends the killing, participates in the
killing, or demonstrates a reckless indifference to the welfare of the victims.").
146 Tison, 481 U.S. at 158 (emphasis added).
147 The Court itself anticipates this collapse in a footnote:
Although we state these two requirements separately, they often overlap.
For example, we do not doubt that there are some felonies as to which
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ants are major participants in the underlying felony, then the courts
will automatically find that they were acting with reckless indiffer-
ence toward human life. For example, suppose that defendant A ac-
companied defendant B in a robbery of a bank and that B had
assured A that no one would get hurt. A merely sat in the car while
B went in and actually robbed the store. All seemed to go as
planned. B got the money, but then for some reason decided to kill
the teller. A could be sentenced to death if a court found that she
was a major participant in the robbery. It is possible that the court
would never even examine the second prong of the Tison test, simply
assuming that anyone who participated to a major extent in a bank
robbery automatically exhibited a reckless indifference toward
human life. The Tison Court suggests this interpretation when it
states: "we do not doubt that there are some felonies as to which
one could properly conclude that any major participant necessarily
exhibits reckless indifference to the value of human life.' 148
Thus, lower courts are left with the responsibility to determine
which crimes carry a grave risk of death. Once the courts make this
determination, they need merely engage in a "matching" analysis.
If the defendant committed felony X she exhibited reckless indiffer-
ence, but if she committed crime Y she did not. At a minimum,
courts should examine the actions and mental state of each defend-
ant to determine whether they show a reckless indifference toward
human life. The mere fact that the defendant engaged in a felony,
albeit a felony that carried a grave risk of loss of human life, should
not suffice to prove reckless indifference toward human life. The
relevant facts should be the defendant's mental state and the actions
taken by the defendant that indirectly caused the victim's death. For
example, someone purchasing gasoline to be used by an arsonist to
destroy an empty theater may not exhibit a reckless indifference to-
ward human life, whereas someone purchasing gasoline so that an
arsonist may destroy a theater that is filled to capacity does exhibit a
reckless indifference toward human life.
C. Tison Departs from Traditional Death Penalty/Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause Analysis
The Tison majority did not faithfully use the balancing approach
in its determination that the Tison brothers' sentence of death com-
one could properly conclude that any major participant necessarily exhib-
its reckless indifference to the value of human life. Moreover, even in
cases where the fact that the defendant was a major participant in a felony
did not suffice to establish reckless indifference, that fact would still often
provide significant support for such a finding.




ported with the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth
amendment. At best, the majority only addressed one factor-soci-
etal views on the crime and punishment in question. The majority
essentially ignored or distorted other factors traditionally consid-
ered in a balancing approach, including: (1) the gravity of the of-
fense and the harshness of the penalty; (2) an individualized
consideration of the defendant's culpability; (3) whether the punish-
ment is disproportionate to the severity of the crime; (4) whether
the punishment is an affront to human dignity; and (5) whether the
punishment contributes to the two social purposes of the death pen-
alty-retribution and deterrence.
The Court looked to state legislative judgments and state court
decisions in order to examine societal views on the death penalty
and felony murder where the defendant did not kill, attempt to kill,
or intend to kill. Based upon this evidence, the Court concluded
that there was an "apparent consensus that substantial participation
in a violent felony under circumstances likely to result in the loss of
innocent human life may justify the death penalty even absent an
'intent to kill.'"149 The Court, however, misapplied this factor
when it did not take into consideration the fact that the Tisons are
the only non-triggermen felony murderers in Arizona who have
been sentenced to death without a finding that they killed or in-
tended to kill.150 Indeed, from 1954 through the summer of 1987,
only six non-triggermen felony murderers have been executed in
the United States. All six were executed in 1955.151 Thus, as the
dissent in Tison stated, imposing the death penalty on the Tisons for
killings they neither committed nor intended is an aberration not
only in Arizona, but also nationally and internationally. The Tison
Court simply ignored this aspect of the balancing test.152
The majority began to make an individualized determination of
the culpability of the Tisons when it recognized that the Tisons did
not have an intent to kill and that American jurisprudence tradition-
ally has accorded harsher punishment for those who act with intent
as opposed to those who act unintentionally or accidentally.153 But
then the majority rejected a consideration of this factor, calling it an
unsatisfying means of determining the most culpable and dangerous
defendants. 54
The Court focuses on the act, or the crime committed, as the
149 Id. at 154.
150 Id. at 178 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151 Id- at 176.
152 See The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 147 (noting that the Tison
Court largely avoided a proportionality analysis).
153 Tison, 481 U.S. at 150-51.
154 Id. at 157.
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most important element in deciding upon the defendant's sentence.
The Court, however, does not recognize that the Tisons did not kill
anyone. The Tisons are treated as if they were the actual murderers
of the Lyons family. Because the Tisons did not kill, the severity of
their punishment-death-must be weighed against the gravity of
their crime-breaking into prison, aiding an escape, and kidnap-
ping. The application of the death penalty for committing these
felonies is disproportionate. Finally, the Court nowhere mentions
how executing the Tisons for murders that they did not commit will
contribute to the two "social purposes"-deterrence and retribu-
tion-which the Court has accepted as justifications for the death
penalty.
D. Tison Will Have an Adverse Public Impact
The Tison decision essentially condones the application of the
felony murder rule at a time when the rule is being questioned and
rejected. Although only three states have abolished the felony mur-
der doctrine, 5 5 nearly all other states have attempted to modify the
rule.' 56 The United States is virtually the only western nation to
follow the rule.157 Many commentators have predicted its eventual
demise because of its conflict with basic principles of criminal jus-
tice. 158 The primary criticism of the felony murder rule is that it
ignores considerations of culpability in imposing criminal liabil-
ity. 159 Criminal liability attaches through the legal fiction of trans-
155 Kentucky and Hawaii have abolished the felony murder rule by legislative action,
while Michigan has done so by judicial decision. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 707-701 (1972);
Ky. REV. STAT. § 507.020 (1975); People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304
(1980).
156 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 11I, at 545, 547; Roth & Sundby, The Felony
Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 446-47
(1985).
157 Roth & Sundby, supra note 156, at 447.
158 See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 111, at 560-61 ("The rational of the [felony
murder] doctrine is that one who commits a felony is a bad person with a bad state of
mind, and he has caused a bad result, so that the fatal result he accomplished was quite
different and a good deal worse than the bad result he intended. Yet it is a general
principle of criminal law that one is not ordinarily criminally liable for bad results which
differ greatly from intended results."); Roth & Sundby, supra note 156, at 492 ("[I]t is
impossible to conceptualize felony murder in a manner that does not run afoul of consti-
tutional guarantees.").
159 Note, Should Courts Use Principles of justification and Excuse to Impose Felony-Murder
Liability? 19 RUTGERS LJ. 451, 477 (1988) (authored by John S. Anooshian) ("the pri-
mary vice of the felony murder rule is that it 'erodes the relation between criminal liabil-
ity and moral culpability' by 'punish[ing] all homicides, committed in perpetration or
attempted perpetration of proscribed felonies whether intentional, unintentional, or ac-
cidental, without the necessity of proving the relation between the homicide and the
perpetrator's state of mind." (quoting People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 783, 402
P.2d 130, 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 446 (1965) (en banc) and from People v. Aaron, 409
Mich. 672, 708, 299 N.W.2d 304, 317 (1980)).
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ferred intent-that is, intent to commit the underlying felony is
transferred to the murder itself.160 Thus, mens rea, a concept at the
foundation of American jurisprudence, 16 1 is not even considered in
felony murder cases. The American Law Institute has even pro-
posed to do away with the felony murder rule. 62 While the Tison
decision does not purport to affirm the felony murder rule in toto, it
does provide a prop for an intellectually sagging doctrine that
should be allowed to crumble. The Supreme Court's decision that
capital punishment may be imposed against the non-triggerman
convicted under the felony murder theory serves as notice that the
Supreme Court does not view the felony murder rule and the conse-
quences it produces as unconstitutional.
The felony murder rule and the Tison decision allow an inequi-
table apportionment of culpability. This inequitable apportionment
not only allows the non-triggerman to be punished as severely as the
triggerman, but also allows the imposition of the death penalty for
what may have been an accidental killing. 163 It is disturbing that the
most severe punishment available under the American judicial sys-
tem can be imposed on the mere basis of the legal theory of accom-
plice liability. 164
160 Roth & Sundby, supra note 156, at 453 ("The felony murder rule may be concep-
tualized as a theory of 'transferred or constructive intent.' This theory posits that the
intent to commit the felony is 'transferred' to the act of killing in order to find culpability
for the homicide."). For a discussion of the felony murder rule as a legal fiction, see
Comment, Constitutional Limitations Upon the Use of Statutory Criminal Presumptions and the
Felony-Murder Rule, 46 Miss. L.J. 1021, 1022 (1975) (authored by William M. Beasley and
Joe P. Coleman).
161 Note, Reckless Indifference as Intent to Kill: The Disproportionality of Punishment after
Tison v. Arizona, 20 CONN. L. REv. 723, 725 (1988) ("The Supreme Court accepts that
mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, principles of Anglo-American juris-
prudence," (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951)).
162 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (Official Draft 1980) [hereinafter "MPC"]. The
American Law Institute would require that homicides committed during a felony be
prosecuted under the intent-to-kill or the depraved heart theory. See"W. LAFAvE & A.
Scorr, supra note 111, at 535, 554. The depraved heart theory is very similar to the
requirements necessitated by Tison. MPC § 210.2 provides a rebuttable presumption of
a depraved heart for certain crimes: robbery, forcible rape, forcible sodomy, arson, bur-
glary, kidnapping, or felonious escape. But see Roth & Sundby, supra note 156, at 492
(arguing that the MPC's rebuttable presumption does not overcome the felony murder
rule's constitutional infirmities).
163 See Note, Enmund v. Florida: The Constitutionality of Imposing the Death Penalty Upon a
Co-felon in Felony Murder, 32 DE PAUL L. REv. 713 (1983) (authored by Laura L. Kerton)
(felony murder doctrine imposes guilt inequitably). But see D.JoNEs, CRIME AND CRMI-
NAL RESPONSIBILrry 132 (1978) (each co-felon is responsible for the acts of the other);
Crum, Causal Relationships and the Felony Murder Rule, 1952 WASH. U.L.Q. 191, 192-93
(1952) (felony murder rule protects the innocent by preventing agreement to commit
the underlying felony).
164 Note, supra note 159, at 477 ("An enlightened society cannot condone the execu-
tion of a human being on the basis of legal principles that operate more like a game of
chance than a rational scheme of punishment). For a discussion of accomplice liability,
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E. Requiring Some Combination of Participation in the Actual
Murder and an Intent to Kill Better Comports with the
Eighth Amendment
Because an individualized examination of responsibility dictates
that an intentional act be punished more severely than an uninten-
tional act,165 any balancing test must include a determination of in-
tent. To preserve the protections of the eighth amendment's cruel
and unusual punishment clause, the Supreme Court should have
clarified its intent requirement under Enmund and added a second
criterion. The intent requirement should explicitly necessitate a
finding of a "desire" to bring about the death of another. In addi-
tion to the requirement of intent,166 the imposition of the death
penalty should be predicated upon a finding of direct physical action
leading to the decedent's murder.1 67 The second criterion would
require evidence of the defendant's participation in the actual mur-
der. Under this two pronged test the court would first ask whether
the defendant took actions that directly caused the defendant's
death. If so, the court would then determine whether the defendant
had the intent or desire to kill the decedent. If the answer to either
of these questions is no, then the court could not sentence the de-
fendant to death. Under this proposed standard, a court could only
rarely sentence a non-triggerman to death because in most cases the
non-triggerman does not take the requisite actions necessary to di-
rectly cause another's death. This two pronged test will restore the
see Dressier, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: New Solutions to
an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L. REV. 91 (1985); Kadish, Complicity, Cause, and Blame: A
Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 323 (1985); Robinson, Imputed Crimi-
nal Liability, 93 YALE LJ. 609 (1984).
165 Tison, 481 U.S. at 155-56 ("Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is the idea that
the more purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and, there-
fore, the more severely it ought to be punished."). See also id at 171 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) ("It is fundamental that 'causing harm intentionally must be punished more
severely than causing the same harm unintentionally.' ") (quoting United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444 (1978)); id. at 172 ("[S]ociety has made a
judgment, which has deep roots in the history of the criminal law... distinguishing at
least for the purpose of the imposition of the death penalty between the culpability of
those who acted with and those who acted without a purpose to destroy life.") (quoting
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)); H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 162
(1968) ("causing harm intentionally must be punished more severely than causing the
same harm unintentionally").
166 Cf Note, supra note 57, at 982 (intent should not be made a matter of federal
constitutional law because the sentencer is best able to evaluate each defendant's unique
culpability).
167 A narrow exception could be created in the case of the non-triggerman defend-
ant who had the authority (either legal or as recognized through some organized hierar-
chical, power structure) to order the triggerman to commit the crime (this would allow
the imposition of the death penalty for leaders in crime organizations or terrorist organ-




proportionality between the harm caused by the defendant's actions
and the defendant's sentence, resulting in a punishment that fits the
crime. Unlike the previous tests of the Supreme Court, under this
test each actor will be held responsible solely for her own actions.
Intent, act, and responsibility will not be imputed to the defendant
through a legal fiction.
If the Supreme Court announced this standard, the disparity
between similar defendants who are and are not executed for similar
crimes will be reduced dramatically. At a minimum, the resulting
higher standard of proof necessitated by the proposed standard will
result in a lower percentage of innocent people being executed.
While this standard would certainty constitute an improvement over
the present Tison or even Enmund standards, the law could be im-
proved even more.
F. Abolishing the Imposition of the Death Penalty for Non-
Triggermen Felony Murderers Best Comports with the
Requirements of the Eighth Amendment
The proportionality analysis and the Court's reasoning in En-
mund, if carried to their logical end, should have compelled the
Court to take the next analytic step: holding that a defendant can-
not be sentenced to death, even if she intended the death of an-
other, unless the defendant took some causal action toward that
end.168 There is no logical reason for holding the non-triggerman
to a different standard than common law murderers when adjudicat-
ing the death penalty. 169 Most theories of responsibility adopt the
view that people should only be punished for actions which they in-
tentionally commit, not acts done under compulsion, and certainly
not acts done by others. 170 Implicit in the jurisprudential theories
underlying Anglo-American criminal law and eighth amendment
cruel and unusual punishment clause analysis is the belief that pun-
ishment is determined based upon the defendant's actions and their
casual connection to the crime committed. The analysis of the En-
mund and Tison Courts, however, contains no similar requirement. A
168 See Dressier, supra note 164, at 136.
169 This standard is usually similar to the intent to kill standard. See generally W.
LAFAVE & A. ScoTrrxupra note 111, at 535 ("Conduct, accompanied by an intent to kill,
which legally causes another's death constitutes murder ... ").
170 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952) ("The contention that
an injury can amount to a crime only when influenced by intention is no provincial or
transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in
freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to
choose between good and evil."); Note, supra note 159, at 477 (The requirement that
"'[a] relation between some mental element and punishment for a harmful act exist




causal connection to the murder is not necessary to bring about ap-
plication of the death penalty under the reasoning in these cases.17
The imposition of punishment should be based upon personal,
rather than vicarious, criminal liability, because the only way to ac-
curately calculate this personal responsibility is through causation.
But the Supreme Court has rejected personal responsibility, instead
adopting the imputation of culpability. This completely goes
against the grain of most death penalty cases where the Court tradi-
tionally has recognized a "need for treating each defendant in a cap-
ital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the
individual."' 172 The Supreme Court cannot treat an individual as
unique and make an individualized consideration of her culpability
and at the same time impute guilt from the actions of another.
Causation and legal responsibility are one and the same con-
cept, but the Court has severed them, dispensing for the most part
with causation, and imputing legal responsibility to the defendant
from the acts of another. True cruel and unusual punishment clause
analysis requires that the defendant's punishment be proportional
to her culpability. Simply because the nontriggerman has been in-
volved in a heinous act that resulted in the death of another does
not mean that the requirements necessary for conviction of murder
should be lowered or that a legal fiction should be imposed to en-
able those requirements to be met. 173 The judicial system should
not allow itself to be twisted or contorted by its desire to exact its
most severe punishment upon an individual whose culpability is not
as great as those for whom the death penalty is normally reserved.
Indeed, it should comport with the underlying rationale of
Enmund. 174
Abolishing the death penalty for non-triggermen would satisfy
the dictates of the cruel and unusual punishment clause. This aboli-
tion would also prevent the miscarriage of justice inherent in En-
mund, where a non-triggerman originally received the death penalty
and the actual triggerman merely received a prison sentence; or Ti-
son, where two tangential actors are sentenced to death for the mur-
der of a family they did not kill. If the Supreme Court abolished the
171 Dressier, supra note 164, at 99, 102 ("Anglo-American law ascertains the legal
guilt and calibrates the appropriate punishment for accomplices in a manner that differs
fundamentally from that applied to perpetrators. Unlike the person who commits the
crime the accomplice need not be causally tied to the harm for which she is punished.").
172 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
173 For an argument that accomplice liability should be measured solely by the ac-
complices' actions that causally result in the harm, see Dressler, supra note 164, at 91.
174 Id. at 136 ("The [Enmund] Court's reasoning, at least in terms of proportionality
analysis, is correct as far as it goes.... The logic of the Court's reasoning should take
the Court further .... It is also unconstitutional to execute accomplices even if they did
intend that a death ensue, if their assistance did not cause the death to occur").
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application of capital punishment in the case of the non-triggerman,
it not only would be following its own precedent and traditional
cruel and unusual punishment analysis, but it also would eliminate
the ambiguity and resulting confusion created by Enmund and Tison.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Tison v. Arizona announced that non-trig-
germen must be judged by a new standard in determining whether
they can be sentenced to death in compliance with the eighth
amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.
This new standard implicitly abandons the doctrine of Enmund v.
Florida while pretending merely to be filling in a gap not provided
for by the Enmund decision. An analysis of the textual, substantive,
or practical consequences of Tison, however, reveals great differ-
ences between Enmund and Tison.
The arbitrary and goal-oriented Tison decision dramatically
heightens the ambiguity of Edmund. The Tison Court was less inter-
ested in following precedent and applying the proportionality test,
implicit in cruel and unusual punishment clause jurisprudence, than
it was in finding a way to broaden the context where courts could
justifiably apply the death penalty. The better view-and one that
fully comports with the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual pun-
ishment clause-is a complete prohibition against applying the
death penalty to a non-triggerman who cannot satisfy the common
law's requirements for murder.
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